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abstract: Hamilton suggested that inflated relatedness between
sisters promotes the evolution of eusociality in haplodiploid popu-
lations. Trivers and Hare observed that for this to occur, workers
have to direct helping preferentially toward the production of sisters.
Building on this, they proposed two biological scenarios whereby
haplodiploidy could act to promote the evolution of eusociality: (a)
workers biasing the sex allocation of the queen’s brood toward fe-
males and (b) workers replacing the queen’s sons with their own
sons. This “worker revolution,” whereby the worker class seizes con-
trol of sex allocation and reproduction, is expected to lead to helping
being promoted in worker-controlled colonies. Here, we use a kin-
selection approach to model the two scenarios suggested by Trivers
and Hare. We show that (1) worker control of sex allocation may
promote helping, but this effect is likely to be weak and short lived;
and (2) worker reproduction tends to inhibit rather than promote
helping. Furthermore, the promotion of helping is reduced by a
number of biologically likely factors, including the presence of work-
ers increasing colony productivity, workers being unmated, and
worker control of sex allocation being underpinned by many loci
each having a small effect. Overall, our results suggest that haplo-
diploidy has had a negligible influence on the evolution of eusociality.
Keywords: kin selection, sex allocation, inclusive fitness, social evo-
lution, helping, altruism.
Introduction
The eusocial world is dominated by the social Hymenop-
tera: the ants, bees, and wasps (Crozier 2008). Hamilton
(1964, 1972) suggested that this owes to their haplodiploid
genetics, whereby unfertilized (haploid) eggs develop into
males and fertilized (diploid) eggs develop into females.
All workers are female, and haplodiploidy leads to a worker
being more related to her full sisters (life-for-life relat-
edness R p 3/4, assuming unbiased sex allocation) than
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to her own daughters (R p 1/2). That is, the worker would
prefer to rear a sister instead of a daughter, all else being
equal. However, things are not so simple, because hap-
lodiploidy also makes a worker less related to her brothers
(R p 1/4) than to her sons (R p 1/2). Thus, with an
unbiased sex allocation, the average relatedness to siblings
is exactly equal to the average relatedness to offspring
(R p 1/2; Hamilton 1972; Trivers and Hare 1976). Fur-
thermore, while a female-biased sex ratio would lead to
workers rearing more sisters, the subsequent increase in
relatedness is exactly negated by the fact that a female-
biased sex ratio also increases the mating success of males,
making females worth relatively less (Trivers and Hare
1976; Craig 1979; Iwasa 1981).
Trivers and Hare (1976) suggested Hamilton’s “haplo-
diploidy hypothesis” could be rescued in two ways. First,
they showed that the higher relatedness between two sisters
(R p 3/4) than between a female and her brother (R p
1/4) means that workers will be favored to bias the sex
allocation of their colony toward females. They suggested
that, as helping spreads through a population, an associ-
ation between helping and the production of female-biased
broods would increase the relatedness of workers to the
siblings that they were helping rear, without the overall
population sex ratio becoming sufficiently female biased
to completely negate this relatedness benefit. Second, they
suggested that workers might replace the queen’s sons with
their own sons. This could further raise the relatedness
between workers and the offspring that they help to rear,
because they are more related to the sons of their sisters
(nephews, R p 3/8) than to the sons of their mother
(brothers, R p 1/4).
Trivers and Hare’s (1976) article has been hugely influ-
ential. In particular, a number of relatively general models
have shown that an association between helping and the
production of relatively female-biased broods, termed
“split sex ratios,” promotes helping (Charnov 1978;
Charlesworth 1980; Iwasa 1981; Grafen 1986; Boomsma
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and Grafen 1990, 1991; Pamilo 1991, Crozier and Pamilo
1993). However, we now have a better understanding of
the life histories associated with the evolution of eusociality
(West 2009; Boomsma et al. 2011), allowing us to ask more
specific questions about the relative magnitude of the hap-
lodiploidy effect in the most biologically relevant scenarios
(e.g., monogamy, subsociality, sex allocation; Boomsma
2007, 2009; Hughes et al. 2008; West 2009; Boomsma et
al. 2011). Biological details matter, because they will de-
termine how helping is associated with the brood sex ratio
but also because factors such as biased sex allocation and
worker reproduction have multiple consequences for ge-
netic similarity of nestmates and the reproductive values
of different classes of individuals.
Here, we examine Trivers and Hare’s (1976) version of
the haplodiploidy hypothesis and determine the magni-
tude of the effect of haplodiploidy, in different biological
scenarios. We model the evolution of altruistic helping,
where a worker rears her colony’s offspring instead of her
own. We focus on the two scenarios suggested by Trivers
and Hare: workers’ control of the colony sex ratio spread-
ing through a population and workers replacing the
queen’s sons with their own. We consider the conse-
quences of variation in biological details that could alter
the association between helping and biased sex ratios, such
as the underlying genetics, strength of selection, extent of
worker reproduction, and rate of sex ratio evolution. We
focus on the two Trivers and Hare (1976) scenarios because
these have been so influential and because we have already
examined the other factors that could lead to split sex
ratios elsewhere, finding them unlikely to have played a
major role in the evolution of eusociality (Gardner et al.
2012a, 2012b; Alpedrinha et al. 2013). In addition, they
are different classes of scenarios, in that Trivers and Hare
(1976) focused on how split sex ratios may arise tran-
siently, as worker control spreads, whereas other scenarios
involve split sex ratios being maintained at equilibrium,
as evolutionarily stable strategies (reviewed by Gardner et
al. 2012a).
Methods
In the following sections, we study the evolution of altru-
istic helping by investigating the impact that the emergence
and spread of helpers and worker control of sex allocation
has on the genetic structure of the population and the
adaptive value of altruistic helping. We then consider the
emergence of worker reproduction in populations where
both the presence of helpers and also worker control are
already established. We consider three scenarios by which
worker reproduction could occur: replacing brothers with
sons, replacing sisters and brothers with sons, and re-
placing sisters and brothers with sons and daughters.
The evolution of eusociality is a highly complex long-
term process in which many traits coevolve in a coordi-
nated fashion to bring about a new level of individuality.
This complexity and the fact that costs and benefits of
helping are themselves expected to evolve over such time-
scales mean that it is inappropriate to perform an analysis
of the evolutionary stable level of worker altruism. Instead,
we investigate the evolutionary incentive of a female who
is deciding whether to help rear b additional juveniles in
her mother’s nest at a personal cost of c own offspring
(this may or may not involve the female giving up all of
her personal reproduction). We consider scenarios where
the juveniles that the worker could help raise in her moth-
ers nest are siblings or a mixture of siblings and nephews/
nieces.
Hamilton (1972) showed that the value of a social part-
ner to a focal actor is measured by how well the former
transmits copies of the latter’s genes to future generations.
This is the product of two quantities: the concentration
of the actor’s genes in the recipient, termed consanguinity
(p; Bulmer 1994), and the expected asymptotic genetic
contribution made by the recipient to future generations,
termed reproductive value (v; Fisher 1930). We assume
weak selection, which allows us to calculate quasi-equilib-
rium values for these quantities (Taylor 1996, Taylor and
Frank 1996). We denote the sex ratio (proportion male)
among the juvenile reproductives in the mother’s nest as
zC and the sex ratio of workers who decide to breed in-
dependently as zO. The worker has an average consan-
guinity pm to the juvenile males in her mother’s nest, pf
to the juvenile females in her mother’s nest, pS to her sons
and pD to her daughters. We calculate these coefficients of
consanguinity in terms of population parameters in ap-
pendix A (apps. A–D available online). The reproductive
values of juvenile reproductive males and females are vm
and vf, respectively, and we calculate these in terms of
population parameters in appendix B. Table 1 summarizes
the notation we use in this article.
Helping increases the worker’s inclusive fitness when
the value of the extra juveniles reared by the worker
outweighs the value of the offspring that she could have
produced had she bred independently, that is, when
b[zCpmvm  (1 – zC)pfvf] 1 c[zOpsvm  (1 – zO)pdvf]. We
may rewrite this condition as c/b ! a, where a defines the
“potential for helping” (Gardner et al. 2012a) and is given
by
z p v  (1  z )p vC m m C f f
a p . (1)
z p v  (1  z )p vO S m O D f
The potential for helping (a) represents the threshold
value of c/b at which the worker is indifferent between
raising juveniles in her mother’s nest versus her own off-
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Table 1: Summary of model notation
Symbol Definition
z Population sex ratio
zC Colony offspring sex ratio
zO Sex ratio strategy of a focal worker breeding independently (new colony)
zQ Queen-controlled colony sex ratio strategy for queen-derived offspring
zW Worker-controlled colony sex ratio strategy for queen-derived offspring
zA Sex ratio strategy of workers for worker-derived offspring
h Proportion of colonies with workers
m Proportion of worker reproduction in the population
u Proportion of colonies where queen-derived offspring is worker controlled
f Paternal kinship index. The probability that any two sperm cells present in the queen sper-
matheca derive from the same male
p Consanguinity of an outbred female to herself; p p 1/2
px Consanguinity between a focal female and a reproductive individual x  {D, S, F, M, Ni,
Ne}, present in the same colony
r Regression coefficient of relatedness of a relative Y to the actor X (r p pYX/pXX): the con-
sanguinity of the actor and recipient (pYX) divided by the consanguinity of the actor to
herself (pXX)
Rx,W Life-for-life relatedness coefficient of a relative Y (Y  {D, S, F, M, Ni, Ne}) to a worker
W; RYW p [(pYW/pWW) # (VY/Vf)]
vm Value of a male, given by the class reproductive value cm over the number of males in the
population z
vf Value of a female, given by the class reproductive value cf over the number of females in
the population 1  z
cm Male class reproductive value
cf Female class reproductive value
N Total number of individuals in the population
K Number of colonies in the population
f Female
m Male
D Daughter
S Son
F Sister
B Brother
Ni Niece
Ne Nephew
spring in her own nest (Charnov 1978; Grafen 1986). The
reciprocal of this quantity (1/a) coincides with Iwasa’s
(1981) “sociality threshold” and Pamilo’s (1991) “effi-
ciency threshold.” In an outbred diploid population, strict
monogamy leads an individual to be equally related to her
siblings and her own offspring, such that helping is favored
when c/b ! 1. Hence, haplodiploidy promotes the evolu-
tion of helping (relative to diploidy) if a 1 1 and inhibits
the evolution of helping if a ! 1. Throughout our analysis,
we will assume outbreeding. In addition, while we present
general results for the potential for helping (a), allowing
for both single and multiple mating (0 ≤ f ≤ 1, where f
is the consanguinity of the sperm cells that are used to
fertilize the queen’s eggs; e.g., f p 1/n if the queen uses
an equal amount of sperm from n unrelated males), we
focus on monogamy (f p 1). We do this because (1)
while both inbreeding and monogamy increase relatedness
within the colony, hymenopteran eusociality has evolved
only in outbred monogamous populations (Boomsma
2007, 2009; Hughes et al 2008); and (2) multiple mating
reduces relatedness between maternal siblings and hence
reduces selection for cooperation (Charnov 1982).
Often, it is convenient to express genetic similarity in
terms of coefficients of relatedness, rather than coefficients
of consanguinity. Throughout this article, we use Ham-
ilton’s (1970) regression coefficient of relatedness (r p p′/
p), which is simply the consanguinity of the actor and
recipient (p′) divided by the consanguinity of the actor to
herself (p; Bulmer 1994). The consanguinity of a female
and her full sister is pF p 3/8, and the consanguinity to
herself is p p 1/2 (app. A); hence, the relatedness to her
full sister is r p (3/8)/(1/2) p 3/4. Similarly, consan-
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guinity of a female and her brother is pM p 1/4 (app. A),
and so the relatedness to her brother is r p (1/4)/(1/2) p
1/2. This regression form provides the general definition
of relatedness (Grafen 1985), which is at the heart of mod-
ern theoretical methodology (Taylor and Frank 1996;
Frank 1998; Grafen 2006; Rousset 2004), and is the basis
for how relatedness is measured in empirical studies, using
molecular markers such as a microsatellites (Queller and
Goodnight 1989). The relationship between regression re-
latedness and life-for-life relatedness are discussed by
Gardner et al. (2012a).
Split Sex Ratios and Helping
We first consider a general model for the evolution of
altruistic helping. We consider a population with negligible
worker reproduction (m p 0) to determine the potential
for helping when the sex ratio among the focal worker’s
offspring is zO, the colony zC and the population average
. Substituting the appropriate consanguinities and repro-z¯
ductive values (apps. A and B) into equation (1), we obtain
¯ ¯z  2zz (1  f)  z(1  2f)C C
a p . (2)
¯ ¯2z  2z  4zzO O
This allows us to assess the overall impact of the sex
ratio (zO, zC, ) on the potential for helping. If we assumez¯
that there is no variation in sex allocation across colonies
(zC p zO p ), then we find that the potential for helpingz¯
is unity (a p 1), irrespective of the population sex ratio
( ). That is, in the absence of split sex ratios, hap-¯0 ! z ! 1
lodiploidy neither promotes nor inhibits the evolution of
helping (Grafen 1986).
In contrast, if different colonies exhibit different sex
ratios (zO ( zC), then we find that haplodiploidy can either
promote (a 1 1) or inhibit (a ! 1) the evolution of helping.
First, assuming only minor variation across colonies
(zC ≈ zO ≈ ), we find that if the sex ratio among thez¯
offspring in the individual’s mother’s colony is female bi-
ased relative to the population average, then helping is
promoted, except in populations with extreme female bias
( if ). This is because workers are¯a/z F ! 0 z 1 1/4¯C z pz pzC O
more related to their sisters than to their brothers, so all
else being equal, the value of a sibling is higher than the
value of a worker’s own offspring. However, this effect is
counterbalanced by an increase in the reproductive value
of males, if the population sex ratio is female biased. If
the sex ratio of the population is strongly female biased
( ), then helping is promoted in colonies where thez¯ ! 1/4
sex ratio is less female biased than the population as a
whole ( if ).¯a/z F 1 0 z ! 1/4¯C z pz pzC O
Second, if the worker can bias her own offspring sex
ratio toward the rarer sex, then this makes her own off-
spring relatively more valuable and hence inhibits helping
(Iwasa 1981; Pamilo 1991). Specifically, if the population
consists mainly of males, the potential for helping de-
creases as the worker produces more sons over daughters
( if and if¯a/z F 1 0 z ! 1/2 a/z F 1 0¯ ¯o z pz pz o z pz pzC O C O
). Third, we find that the potential for helping in-z¯ 1 1/2
creases with increasing population male bias in sex allo-
cation ( for all 0 ! ! 1). That is, if the¯ ¯a/zF 1 0 z¯z pz pzC O
sex allocation among the worker’s own offspring and
among her siblings are both slightly female biased relative
to the population average, then this promotes the evolu-
tion of helping. These results illustrate that haplodiploidy
can promote or inhibit the evolution of helping, depending
on the inclusive fitness value of own versus the colony
offspring, which is determined by sex allocation.
Worker Control of Sex Allocation
We now consider the early evolution of the eusociality
scenario envisaged by Trivers and Hare (1976, pp. 251–
252), where helping already occurs in some colonies but
not in others. Trivers and Hare (1976) argued that as
worker control of sex allocation spreads through a pop-
ulation, this worker revolution over the control of sex
allocation allows haplodiploidy to promote the evolution
of eusociality. Their scenario involves the following steps.
Step 1: some daughters stay and help their mothers,
rather than breeding independently. Step 2: the queen al-
locates equal resources into male and female offspring.
Step 3: a mutation (or a small number of mutations) oc-
curs that allows workers to bias the sex ratio of the brood
that they are helping to raise toward females (sisters). Step
4: while the mutation is spreading, colonies that contain
workers with the mutation will be raising broods of re-
productive offspring that are biased toward females, rel-
ative to the population as a whole. Step 5: consequently,
these workers gain the relatedness benefit of rearing a
greater proportion of sisters, without this being exactly
canceled by an increased reproductive success of males,
and so workers are favored to increase altruistic helping.
Step 6: as worker control spreads, workers evolve spe-
cialized adaptations to cooperative breeding, which in-
creases the efficiency benefit of cooperation (lower c/b,
which helps drive the evolution of eusociality.
This scenario focuses on the early stages of evolution
toward eusociality, when both the presence of workers and
worker control over the sex ratio need not be fixed in the
population. We assume that a juvenile female has the op-
portunity to either stay at her mother’s colony and help
rear siblings or leave her mother’s colony to start a new
colony of her own. We assume that (a) a proportion h of
colonies contain workers and a proportion 1 – h of col-
onies are workerless and (b) a proportion u of colonies
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that contain workers have their sex allocation controlled
by those workers, whereas a proportion 1 – u of colonies
that contain workers have their sex allocation controlled
by the queen. All workerless colonies have their sex al-
location controlled by the queen. We denote the sex ratio
of worker-controlled colonies by zW and the sex ratio of
queen-controlled colonies by zQ.
We assume that any differences in productivity between
colonies with and without workers are negligible, and so
the average sex allocation in the population is pz¯
huzW  (1 – hu)zQ. We make this assumption for ease of
analysis and also because we wish to consider the best-
case scenario for the evolution of helping—differences in
productivity would reduce the effective variance in sex-
allocation strategies in the population, leading to lower
potential for helping and hence inhibit helping (Abugov
1981; Iwasa 1981; Andersson 1984; Grafen 1986; Pamilo
1991; Gardner et al. 2012a). From equation (1), it is clear
that the potential for helping depends on the population
sex ratio (and also on the colony sex ratio, if helping is
facultative). However, the proportion of colonies with
helpers h also affects sex allocation. Thus, we consider two
scenarios that represent the two extreme end points of the
possible continuum, that sex ratios remain relatively con-
stant over the course of the worker revolution (“fast
worker revolution”) or that sex ratios attain their con-
vergence-stable values (Eshel and Motro 1981) effectively
instantaneously over the course of the worker revolution
(“slow worker revolution”).
Fast Worker Revolution
We start by assuming that worker control of sex ratio
spreads rapidly relative to the timescale of sex ratio evo-
lution, such that we can consider sex ratio strategies as
fixed parameters. We assume that queen-controlled col-
onies exhibit an unbiased sex ratio (zQ p 1/2), and worker-
controlled colonies exhibit a female-biased sex ratio (0 !
zW ! 1/2). We consider two different scenarios, which differ
in whether helping behavior is linked to the colony sex
ratio. First, we consider the potential for obligate helping,
which is enacted independently of whether the colony’s
sex allocation is under worker or queen control. Second,
we consider the potential for facultative helping, which is
enacted only in colonies where workers control sex allo-
cation. This could occur either via conditional adjustment
of helping behavior or if helping and sex ratio biasing were
genetically linked.
Obligate Helping. Our first task is to calculate the offspring
sex ratio that the worker would produce, were she to leave
her mother’s nest and breed independently (zO). She would
gain workers with a probability h, who would control the
colony sex allocation with probability u. Consequently, her
offspring sex ratio would be worker-controlled with a
probability hu, leading to a sex ratio of zW, and would be
under her own control with probability 1 – hu, leading to
a sex ratio of zQ. Hence, her average expected sex ratio is
given by zO p huzW  (1 – hu)zQ, which is also the expected
population sex ratio .z¯
Our next task is to calculate the sex ratio of the siblings
that the worker could help rear were she to stay and help
at her mother’s nest. The colony sex ratio would be under
worker control with probability u and queen control with
probability 1 – u, leading to a average sex ratio of zC p
uzW  (1 – u)zQ.
We now examine the consequences of this sex ratio
variation across colonies for the evolution of helping. We
substitute the appropriate consanguinities and reproduc-
tive values (apps. A and B) into equation (1), which gives
1  f  u(1  2z ) hu(1  2z )  f{1  h[1  u(1  2z )]}( )W W W
a p .
22  2[hu(1  2z )]W
(3)
Helping is favored so long as both the frequencies of
colonies with workers and with worker control are low,
specifically, a 1 1 if u ! 1/[2h(1 – 2zW)]. We illustrate the
results from equation (3) in figure 1a, assuming that the
sex ratio in worker-controlled colonies is 75% female
(zW p 1/4), which is the convergence-stable sex ratio for
a population where all colonies are worker controlled (a
greater female bias would lead to a higher a). We find that
worker control of sex allocation can promote helping and
that this effect is greater when (a) the proportion of col-
onies with workers is lower (lower h) and (b) workers are
in control of sex allocation at a higher proportion of the
colonies with workers (higher u).
Why is obligate helping less readily promoted as workers
become more common? As long as there is some worker
control of sex allocation (u 1 0), then a higher frequency
of workers (higher h) leads to a more female-biased sex
ratio at the population level, which reduces the repro-
ductive value of females and increases the reproductive
value of males. As the sex ratio of siblings is more female
biased than that of offspring (zC ! zQ, when h ! 1), this
reduces the relative value of helping relative to breeding
independently.
Why is obligate helping more readily promoted as
worker control becomes more common? Greater worker
control of sex allocation has two consequences. First, it
leads to workers helping rear, on average, a more female-
biased mixture of brothers and sisters. This increases the
relatedness between helpers and the offspring that they
help raise and hence promotes helping. Second, it leads
to a more female-biased sex ratio at the population level,
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Figure 1: Worker control and the evolution of helping with fixed sex ratios. Shown are the predictions for the potential for helping, for
the scenario where colonies in which queens control sex allocation produce 50% females (zQ p 1/2) and colonies in which workers control
the sex ratio produce 75% females (zW p 1/4). a, Obligate helping, given independent of sex allocation in the colony: the potential for
helping increases with the proportion of colonies where workers control sex allocation and decreases with the proportion of colonies with
workers. b, Facultative helping, directed only at colonies where workers control sex allocation: the potential for helping decreases with both
the proportion of colonies where there are workers (h) and the proportion of those colonies where workers control sex allocation (u).
which reduces the relative value of females and hence in-
hibits helping as described in the above paragraph. Overall,
so long as the population sex ratio is not extremely female
biased, the first effect is larger and increased worker con-
trol promotes helping (da/du 1 0 if zC ! zQ and ).z¯ 1 1/4
Facultative Helping. We now consider the evolution of fac-
ultative helping, which is enacted only in colonies where
workers control sex allocation. The difference here is that
we are considering the relative value of an additional
amount of helping directed at offspring with a female-
biased sex ratio of zC p zW, which does not vary with h
and u. We substitute the appropriate consanguinities and
reproductive values (apps. A and B) into equation (1), and
obtain
1 2z 2(1  z )(1  2f)W W
a p  . (4)[ ]4 1  hu(1  2z ) 1  hu(1  2z )W W
If workers produce a moderately female-biased sex ratio
(1/4 ≤ zW ≤ 1/2), facultative helping is always promoted.
More generally, a 1 1 if u ! 1/[2h(1 – 2zW)]. We illustrate
the predictions from equation (4) in figure 1b, assuming
that the sex ratio in worker-controlled colonies is 75%
female (zW p 1/4).
As with obligate helping, an increase in the proportion
of colonies with workers (h) reduces the extent to which
helping is promoted (da/dh ≤ 0), because it leads to a
decrease in the relative reproductive value of females (fig.
1b). This inhibits facultative helping because the sex ratio
of siblings that could be helped will be more female biased
than the sex ratio of offspring that could be produced
(zC ! zQ when h ! 1). However, in contrast to obligate
helping, we now find that an increased frequency of col-
onies with workers (h) also leads to a reduced promotion
of helping (da/du ≤ 0; fig. 1b). The reason for this is that
we are only examining selection on helping at worker-
controlled colonies, and so the frequency of worker control
(u) does not influence the sex ratio of siblings helped.
Consequently, the only influence of a greater proportion
of colonies with workers is to reduce the relative repro-
ductive value of females, which reduces the relative value
of helping (because zC ! zQ when h ! 1). Overall, the
maximum value for the potential for facultative helping
is reached when both the proportion of colonies with
workers and the frequency of worker control are vanish-
ingly small (a p 1.25 when h ≈ 0 and u ≈ 0).
Slow Worker Revolution
We now relax the assumption that sex ratio strategies are
fixed, and instead assume that the presence of workers and
worker control spreads slowly relative to the timescale of
sex ratio evolution. More specifically, we assume that
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worker-controlled (zW) and queen-controlled (zQ) sex ra-
tios are always at their convergence-stable values, with
respect to the frequency of both workers (h) and worker
control (u). In this scenario, the colony sex ratios emerge
from the other population parameters, rather than being
left as free variables (i.e., it is a more “closed” model;
Gardner and West 2006). This does not mean the model
is necessarily more accurate but rather emphasizes that it
considers a different scenario.
In appendix C, we show that the joint convergence-
stable sex ratio strategies for queen-control and worker-
control colonies are given by
1 1
, 0 if h ![ ]2(1  hu) 2u
1 1  2f
(z , z ) p (1, 0) if ≤ h ≤ .Q W 2u 2u(1  f)
1  2(1  hu)(1  f) 1  2f{
1, if h 1[ ]2hu(1  f) 2u(1  f)
(5)
We illustrate the predictions from equation (5) in figure
2. In a population with a low proportion of colonies with
worker control (i.e., low h or low u), queen-controlled
colonies produce an unbiased sex ratio, while worker-con-
trolled colonies produce only female offspring. As the pro-
portion of colonies with worker control (hu) increases in
the population, the sex ratio produced by queen-control
colonies becomes increasingly male biased, to compensate
for the excess of females produced in worker-controlled
colonies. As a result, the population sex ratio becomes
female biased only when worker control of sex allocation
is sufficiently common ( ! 1/2 if h 1 [1/2]u; fig. 2c).z¯
We assume the sex ratio strategies given in equation (5),
the appropriate consanguinities and reproductive values
(apps. A and B), and substitute these into equation (1).
In this case, the potential for helping (a) is given by
1  f(1  u)  hu(1  2f) 1
if h !
2(1  hu) 2u
1  h(1  2u)  2f(1  2hu) 1 1  2f
a p if ≤ h ≤ ,
4h(1  hu) 2u 2u(1  f)
1  f 1  2f{
if h 1
2 2u(1  f)
(6)
for obligate helping (fig. 3a), and
1  2f 1
if h !
2 2u
1  2f 1 1  2f
a p if ≤ h ≤ , (7)
4hu 2u 2u(1  f)
1  f 1  2f{
if h 1
2 2u(1  f)
for facultative helping (fig. 3b).
Both obligate and facultative helping are promoted as
long as the frequency of worker control is below a thresh-
old (a 1 1 if u ! [3/4]h). The main difference between
the two scenarios is that helping reaches higher values for
a wider range of parameters for facultative helping (a p
1.5 only if h ≈ 1 for obligate helping and if h ! [1/2]u for
facultative helping).
The evolving sex ratios scenario (fig. 3) leads to a higher
potential for helping compared with the fixed ratio sce-
nario (fig. 1; zQ p 1/2, zW p [1/4]). This difference arises
because the evolving sex ratios model leads to greater sex
ratio variation between the colony types.
Worker Reproduction
The other scenario that Trivers and Hare (1976; pp. 250–
251) suggested could lead to haplodiploidy promoting the
evolution of eusociality is if workers “deny to the queen
the production of males.” The idea here is that workers
replace the sons of the queen with their own sons and that
this would favor helping because workers are more related
to the sons of their sisters (nephews, r p 3/4) than to the
sons of their mother (brothers, r p 1/2). Consequently,
workers could benefit by raising sisters and nephews rather
than sisters and brothers. This idea implies that a worker
caste is already established in the population, and the ques-
tion changes to what extent does haplodiploidy promote
the maintenance of helping (Gardner et al. 2012a).
Worker reproduction has two consequences. First, it
means that workers increasingly rear nephews instead of
siblings, which changes the relatedness of a worker to the
larvae she could help to rear (Trivers and Hare 1976).
Second, it changes male gene transmission and hence the
class reproductive values of males and females (Trivers and
Hare 1976; Grafen 1986, Pamilo 1991). In a haplodiploid
system with no worker reproduction, males censused in
each generation trace none of their genes to males in the
previous census, leading the total reproductive value of
males to be half that of females. However, when there is
worker reproduction a male can contribute genes to the
next generation of reproductive males via the reproduction
of his worker’s daughters, and this increases the repro-
ductive value of males to more than half that of females
(Gardner et al. 2012a, 2012b).
Here, we study three scenarios: replacement of brothers
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Figure 3: Worker control and the evolution of helping with evolving sex ratios. Shown are the predictions for the potential for helping,
for the scenario where sex ratio strategies for queen-controlled colonies and for worker-controlled colonies evolve. a, Obligate helping as
a function of sex ratio evolution: the potential for helping increases with the proportion of worker control and decreases with the proportion
of colonies with workers. b, Facultative helping, directed only at colonies where workers control sex allocation: the potential for helping
decreases with both the proportion of colonies where there are workers (h) and the proportion of those colonies where workers control
sex allocation (u).
with nephews, replacement of brothers and sisters with
nephews, and replacement of brothers and sisters with
nephews and nieces. We focus our attention on the sce-
nario where all colonies have workers (h p 1) and workers
have complete control of sex allocation (u p 1). Also, as
all colonies have workers, the potential for helping con-
siders the decision of a focal worker faced with the option
of either helping to rear b of the queen’s offspring or
produce c of her own offspring within the colony. We
assume a large number of workers, so that the probability
of a focal worker aiding her own offspring is rare. Con-
sequently, from the perspective of a worker, the colony
offspring comprises mainly siblings and nephews. More
generally, any benefits of helping that accrue to the
worker’s own offspring can be considered as mediating
the net direct effect of helping (c) rather than its indirect
benefit (rb).
Brothers Replaced by Nephews
We assume that workers are able to distinguish be-
tween male and female juveniles and that a fraction m of
the queen’s sons are replaced by the workers’ sons. We
assume that workers do not mate and are constrained to
produce sons (zO p 1). Thus, following equation (1),
the potential for helping (a) is given by a p
{zWvm[mpNe  (1 – m)pM]  (1 – zW)vfpF}/vmpS.
Fast Worker Revolution. As with our spread of worker con-
trol model, we now need to make assumptions about the
sex ratios produced in different colonies. If we assume that
the sex ratio produced in colonies is a fixed variable zW,
then the potential for helping simplifies to a p zW(2 –
m  2f)/2. In this case, if workers produce a female-biased
sex ratio, then helping is inhibited (if zW ≤ 1/2, then a ≤
1) and the potential for helping decreases with the fre-
quency of worker replacement (da/dm ≤ 0; fig. 4a).
Why is helping inhibited when workers produce sons
at the expense of brothers? We are comparing, for a worker,
the relative value of producing a female-biased mixture of
siblings and nephews versus the production of sons. Con-
sidering the siblings and nephews, both the female-biased
sex ratio and the substitution of nephews for brothers leads
to an increase in relatedness to the individuals that she
could be helping to raise. However, at the same time, both
the overall female bias in the population sex ratio and
worker reproduction (see below) lead to a relative increase
in the reproductive value of males. This increase in the
relative value of males is so great that sons are worth
relatively more than a mixture of siblings and nephews.
Why does helping become more inhibited as the amount
of worker reproduction increases? An increase of worker
reproduction frequency has two consequences. First, it in-
creases the average relatedness of potential helpers to the
offspring they could be helping raise. Second, worker re-
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production increases the reproductive value of males,
which goes from cm p 1/3 when m p 0 to cm p 1/2, when
m p 1. This change in reproductive value occurs because,
in a haplodiploid genetic system, males transmit genes only
through their daughters. Consequently, if brothers are re-
placed with nephews, this means that males also transmit
genes to males from the next generation, through their
daughters (workers), raising the reproductive value of
males. Overall, this second effect is greater, and so greater
levels of worker reproduction select against helping (fig.
4a).
Slow Worker Revolution. We now relax the assumption that
colony sex ratios are fixed strategies and instead assume
that sex ratios evolve rapidly relative to other life-history
variables. More specifically, we assume that the colony sex
ratio is always at its convergence-stable values, with respect
to the fraction of the queen’s sons that are replaced by
the workers’ sons (m). In this case, the convergence-stable
strategy for the colonies’ sex ratio is given by p [2 –*z W
m(1 – 2f)]/[2(2 – m  2f)] (see app. D for derivation).
As the frequency of worker production (m) increases, this
raises the relatedness between workers and the males that
they could help rear, leading to a less female-biased sex
ratio. In the extreme, if all male offspring were replaced
by workers (m p 1), workers would favor an unbiased
colony sex ratio ( p 1/2).*z W
In this scenario, the potential for helping is given by
a p [2 – m(1 – 2f)])/4. As with fixed sex ratio strategies,
a mixture of siblings and nephews is also worth less than
sons, and so helping is inhibited (a ! 1; fig. 4a). However,
in contrast to the situation with fixed sex ratios, the relative
advantage of helping increases with the extent of worker
reproduction (da/dm 1 0; fig. 4a). The reason for this is
that, with evolving sex ratios, worker reproduction leads
to less female-biased sex ratios, as described above. This,
in turn, reduces the relative reproduction value of males,
decreasing the value of sons relative to a mixture of sibling
and nephews.
Brothers and Sisters Replaced by Nephews
We now relax the assumption that workers are able to
discriminate between male and female eggs laid by the
queen. Instead, we assume that workers replace siblings
of both sexes with sons (or, equivalently, just add their
sons to the brood of the queen). In this case, the colony
offspring is composed of a fraction m of worker-derived
offspring and a fraction 1 – m of queen-derived offspring,
and the potential for helping is given by a p {mvmpNe 
(1 – m)[zWvmpM  (1 – zW)vfpF)]}/ vmpS. If we assume that
the sex ratio produced in colonies is a fixed variable zW,
then the potential for helping is a p [m  2fm  2zW #
(1 – m)(1  f)]/2. In this case, the potential for helping
increases with the frequency of worker reproduction (da/
dm ≥ 0) and decreases with an increase of the sex ratio
female bias (da/dzW ≤ 0). Thus, helping is promoted by
haplodiploidy when there is a high frequency of worker
reproduction and low female-bias in the sex ratio (a 1 1
if m 1 [2 – 4zW)/(3 – 4 zW]; fig. 4b). If we assume that sex
allocation is an evolving trait (see app. D, eq. [D1]), then
the potential for helping is
2  mf 2
if m ≤
2  2f 3  2f
a p . (8)3m 2{ if m ≤
2 3  2f
In this case, helping is promoted by sufficiently high fre-
quencies of worker replacement (a 1 1 if m 1 2/3 and da/
dm ≥ 0; fig. 4b).
As with the previous scenario, and for the same reasons,
we find that worker replacement generally led to an in-
hibition of helping (a ! 1). There are, however, two qual-
itative differences. First, in the scenario with fixed sex ra-
tios, the potential for helping increases with the extent of
worker reproduction. As worker reproduction (sons) be-
comes more common, the sex ratio becomes less female
biased and eventually male biased. This increases the rel-
ative reproductive value of females and hence increases
the relative advantage of raising siblings relative to sons.
Second, when the extent of worker reproduction is suf-
ficiently high, then helping is promoted rather than in-
hibited. This is because (a) the reproductive value of fe-
males increases, and (b) at very high levels of worker
reproduction, workers are effectively comparing nephews
versus sons, and they are more related to the former. How-
ever, the extent of worker reproduction required to give
a 1 1 is unrealistic, because it requires that colonies raise
predominantly sons of workers, and so there would be a
huge advantage to raising females (i.e., for lower m or for
workers to mate).
Brothers and Sisters Replaced by Nephews and Nieces
We now relax the assumption that workers can produce
only sons and examine the scenario where workers replace
siblings with a mixture of sons and daughters. We assume
that both queen-produced and worker-produced offspring
are under worker control such that both types of offspring
are produced with the same sex ratio. In the supplementary
information, we show that the potential for helping is the
same in the fixed and evolving sex ratio scenarios and is
given by a p {2 – m  f [2 – m(1 – m)]}/4 (fig. 4c). If
worker reproduction is very low m ≈ 0, we recover the
result from Gardner et al. (2012a, 2012b) that workers
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value equally the colony and their own offspring and help-
ing is not promoted or inhibited by haplodiploidy. As
worker reproduction increases in the population, the po-
tential for helping decreases due to an overall decrease in
relatedness of the colony offspring to a focal worker. As
a result, helping is inhibited if workers produce a pro-
portion of the colony offspring (see app. D for derivation).
Empirical studies find rates of worker reproduction
from 0% to 100%, with an average of 12% (Ratnieks et
al. 2006; Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2006), which would lead
to worker reproduction inhibiting helping (a ≈ 0.6 if
zW p 1/4, and a ≈ 0.5 if zW p ). Thus, our results*z W
suggest that the evolution of helping is not facilitated in
the scenarios in which workers replace some of the queen’s
sons with their own sons (fig. 4a). Only the replacement
of sons with nephews and nieces can provide the condi-
tions for helping to be promoted (fig. 4c).
Discussion
We have quantified the possible role for haplodiploidy to
promote the evolution of eusociality in the classic hap-
lodiploidy hypothesis, as described by Trivers and Hare
(1976). We found that (1) worker control of sex allocation
can facilitate the evolution of helping, but this effect is
likely to be relatively minor and only temporary (figs. 1,
3); and (2) worker reproduction does not promote the
evolution of helping, because a female-biased population
sex ratio leads workers to value their sons more than they
value a mixture of siblings and nephews (i.e., a ≤ 1; fig.
4). Overall, our results suggest that haplodiploidy is un-
likely to have played a major role in facilitating the evo-
lution of eusociality in such scenarios.
Worker Control
We found that worker control of sex allocation can facil-
itate the evolution of helping but that this is appreciable
only when the proportion of worker-controlled colonies
(hu) is low (figs. 1 and 3). This means that the spread of
worker control would negate any facilitation of helping.
The proportion of colonies harboring workers (h) and the
proportion of such colonies in which the workers have
seized control of sex allocation (u) are unlikely to both be
small, as selection for worker control of sex allocation can
occur only when some individuals are acting as workers.
Consequently, the scenario where haplodiploidy could
have the greatest influence (low h and low u) is unlikely
to occur. Overall, as worker control spreads, the benefit
to helping will initially be small (low u, medium to high
h), and then disappear (high u, high h).
As suggested by Trivers and Hare (1976), we found that
facultative helping, occurring only in colonies with worker
control of sex allocation, is more strongly promoted than
is helping that occurs in all colonies that contain workers
(cf. figs. 1, 3). However, this link between sex allocation
and helping would require one of two further assumptions,
both of which limit its importance. First, workers could
conditionally adjust their behavior depending on the type
of colony in which they find themselves. Even if workers
could assess their colony type, this would only facilitate
the evolution of facultative helping behaviors and not ob-
ligate traits such as sterility, which are the hallmark of
eusociality (Crespi and Yanega 1995; Boomsma 2009). Sec-
ond, the helping and sex allocation behaviors of workers
might be genetically linked. There is no reason to expect
genetic linkage to be common across these traits, let alone
that this should be the norm. Moreover, in this scenario
helping is favored transitively, as the potential for helping
(a) decreases with an increase of the frequencies of col-
onies with workers and worker control.
Productivity and Sex Ratio Control
Haplodiploidy and worker control of sex allocation are
much less likely to facilitate the evolution of helping than
suggested by our results (figs. 1, 3). First, we have assumed
that any differences in productivity between colonies with
and without workers are negligible. However, potential
helpers would only be selected to stay and help if this led
to an increase in colony productivity. While this produc-
tivity benefit promotes the evolution of helping, in both
diploids and haplodiploids, it also reduces the effective
variance in sex-allocation strategies in the population,
which reduces the extent to which haplodiploidy promotes
helping (Gardner et al. 2012a). Second, we have assumed
that the sex ratio among worker-derived offspring is con-
strained, owing either to the absence of worker mating
(such that workers produce only sons) or else to inter-
ference from other workers (such that their offspring have
the same sex ratio as the queen’s offspring). Worker con-
trol of sex allocation leads to a female bias at the popu-
lation level, which increases the reproductive value of
males. Consequently, if workers are more likely to be able
to rear sons, then this would be favored over rearing a
female-biased mixture of siblings (i.e., helping is inhibited
rather than facilitated; see when m p 0 in fig. 4b). This
could be a result of workers being unmated or less likely
to obtain helpers, which might occur if they were breeding
later in a season.
Third, we have implicitly assumed that there can be
substantial differences between individuals in the extent
to which they control and adjust sex allocation and the
extent to which this could be linked with helping behavior.
For example, some colonies are under complete worker
control, while other colonies are under complete queen
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control. However, almost all quantitative traits that have
been studied, including the sex ratio behavior of a wasp,
have been to shown to be underpinned by many loci, each
having a small effect (Lynch and Walsh 1998; Pannebakker
et al 2008). In this case, we would expect relatively small
differences, leading to smaller sex ratio differences between
colonies and hence a lower potential for helping. For ex-
ample, the spread of worker evolution would involve a
more gradual change across all colonies from 50% to 75%
females, rather than colonies that produce 50% females
being replaced by colonies that produce 75% females. This
means that split sex ratios would not really occur, and so
haplodiploidy would not promote helping (if zQ ≈ zW, then
a ≈ 1). While there is no empirical evidence for a mixture
of worker and queen control leading to substantially split
sex ratios, it could be due to either this not occurring or
it being a transient phenomenon.
Dynamical Assumptions
There are two important limitations to our analyses. First,
we use a separation of timescales, assuming that worker
evolution and/or worker reproduction evolve much faster
or much slower than sex allocation (Otto and Day 2011;
Rousset 2004, 2006). This allows us to focus on relatively
static scenarios, where we analyze the influence of different
factors separately (open model; Gardner and West 2006).
In reality, parameters such as the frequency of workers
(h), the extent to which workers control sex allocation (v),
and the different sex allocation strategies (zO, zC, ) couldz¯
vary between individuals or coevolve over a similar time-
scale to the evolution of worker altruistic helping. Fur-
thermore, the way in which these traits coevolve could
depend on the distribution of alleles in the population for
particular traits or genetic associations between traits,
which could lead to dynamic models giving different pre-
dictions from equilibrium models (Gardner et al 2007).
Second, our model parameters lack an explicit mechanistic
underpinning. Mechanistic models could lead to param-
eters taking particular forms and being associated in spe-
cific ways. The general issue here, with both limitations,
is that models developed and analyzed using different ap-
proaches, such as more mechanistic individual-based sim-
ulations, could make different predictions.
We chose an inclusive fitness approach because (a) we
lack sufficient biological knowledge to make more explicit
mechanistic models—although we could make more pre-
cise assumptions, they would not necessarily be valid; (b)
the evolution of eusociality represents a major, long-term,
open-ended transition in which multiple traits coevolve in
a coordinated way to give rise to a new level of biological
organization and so is less amenable to a closed-model
approach; and (c) we wanted to develop models that could
provide a relatively general overview, relevant to the range
of biological scenarios under which eusociality has evolved.
Consequently, rather than calculate an equilibrium level
of altruism for a single specific scenario, which would
require that we make assumptions about what the costs
and benefits of altruism are, we quantified the threshold
cost/benefit ratio at which altruism would be favored.
Nonetheless, we stress that if certain scenarios can be
shown to be especially relevant, it would be extremely
useful to analyze them with a more mechanistic, closed-
model approach.
Could haplodiploidy be important, even when it leads
to the potential for helping (a) being only slightly greater
than 1.0? Assume that there are two species, one diploid
and one haplodiploid, for which the costs and benefits of
helping are the same. Now imagine that the diploid species
has a potential for helping of 1 and the haplodiploid spe-
cies has a potential for helping of 1.05, on account of the
haplodiploidy effect. Then, if c/b ! 1.00, helping will be
favored in both species, and if c/b 1 1.05, helping will be
disfavored in both species. It is only within the narrow
margin 1.00 ! c/b ! 1.05 that helping is disfavored under
diploidy but favored under haplodiploidy. An ideal mea-
sure of the haplodiploidy effect is the proportion of all
species that find themselves in that narrow zone. However,
in the absence of comprehensive data (or an explicit
model) that would allow us to assess the scatter of c/b
values across all species, pragmatism forces us to rely on
a as a proxy of the haplodiploidy effect. An effect of 5%
strikes us as quite weak, considering the dramatic effect
that other factors—such as monogamy versus multiple
mating—has on the potential for helping (Gardner et al
2012).
Conclusions
Our results suggest that worker control of sex allocation
and worker reproduction are unlikely to have led to hap-
lodiploidy appreciably facilitating the evolution of euso-
ciality. We have previously argued that the other mecha-
nisms for split sex ratios, suggested since Trivers and Hare’s
(1976) article, are unlikely to have played a major role in
promoting the evolution of helping (Gardner et al. 2012a,
2012b; Alpedrinha et al. 2013). Consequently, while Trivers
and Hare’s (1976) predictions about sex ratio conflict in
the social insects have led to one of the most productive
areas of social evolution (West 2009), they do not succeed
in rescuing the haplodiploidy hypothesis for the evolution
of eusociality. While haplodiploidy could mediate the evo-
lution of eusociality for other reasons not connected with
the inflated relatedness of full sisters (Stubblefield and
Charnov 1986; Wade 2001; Lehmann et al. 2008; Frohmage
and Kokko 2011; Johnstone et al. 2011; Gardner 2012;
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Gardner and Ross 2013), the empirical evidence suggests
that the distribution of eusociality is better explained by
other aspects of biology, such as lifetime monogamy
(Boomsma 2007, 2009, 2013; Hughes et al. 2008). Simi-
larly, the sex ratio of helpers appears to be determined by
ecology and not whether a species is diploid or haplodip-
loid (Ross et al. 2013; Davies and Gardner 2014). More
generally, these results highlight the distinction between
inclusive fitness theory, with its application across the en-
tire tree of life (Bourke 2011; Davies et al. 2012), versus
the haplodiploidy hypothesis per se.
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“It seems desirable to add the testimony of Mr. Bates as to the Œc[odoma] cephalotes, the common species of South America. ‘This insect,
from its ubiquity, immense numbers, eternal industry, and its plundering propensities, becomes one of the most important animals of
Brazil. Its immense hosts are unceasingly occupied in defoliating trees [...]. They have regular divisions of laborers, numbers mounting the
trees and cutting off the leaves in irregularly rounded pieces the size of a shilling, another relay carrying them off as they fall.’” From “Notes
on Mexican Ants” by Edward Norton (The American Naturalist, 1868, 2:57–72).
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